STS-114 Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) Post-Flight Assessment by Christiansen, E. et al.
Orbital Debris Quarterly News
2
PROJECT REVIEWS
The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for 
LAD-C was held in Houston, Texas on 31 May 
2006. The U.S. Department of  Defense Space 
Test Program (DoD STP) organized and hosted 
the PDR. Participants included LAD-C team 
members from the U.S. Naval Research Labora-
tory (NRL), STP, and the NASA Orbital Debris 
Program Offi ce, as well as engineers supporting 
International Space Station (ISS) and Extra Ve-
hicular Activity (EVA) Offi ces.
A total of  10 presentations were given dur-
ing the PDR. They covered project, science, and 
instrument overview, mechanical design, mate-
rial control, electronic design, software fl ow and 
data acquisition, thermal control, test plans, and 
EVA issues. At the conclusion of  this successful 
PDR, issues and action items were summarized, 
and assigned to various members for follow-up 
in regular biweekly teleconferences.
LAD-C will benefi t orbital debris, cosmic 
dust, and satellite safety communities. Major 
contributing organizational members of  LAD-
C and their responsibilities are: NRL (lead, man-
agement, acoustics, engineering), NASA Orbital 
Debris Program Offi ce (science planning and 
operations), JAXA/ISAS and Chiba University 
(aerogel, calibration), ESA Space Debris Of-
fi ce (system software, calibration), UC Berkeley 
(calibration), University of  Kent at Canterbury 
(calibration). The DoD STP offi ce is in charge 
of  fl ight preparations, including system integra-
tion and safety. The responsibility of  post-fl ight 
analysis and modeling will be shared by all team 
members. The current schedule for LAD-C is: 
Safety Review on 16 August 2006, Critical De-
sign Review (CDR) in November 2006, and 
system delivery in September 2007. The deploy-
ment is tentatively scheduled for 2008, with re-
trieval in 2009.     ♦
ISS Large Area Debris Collector (LAD-C) Update 
Publication 62530, History of  On-Orbit Satellite 
Fragmentations, 13th edition).  The Tsyklon third 
stages, with a dry mass of  about 1360 kg, used 
hypergolic propellants, namely nitrogen tetrox-
ide and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine.  A 
mixture or over-pressurization of  these pro-
pellants could lead to a tank rupture.
On 10 June, a 17-year-old ullage motor 
from a Russian Proton launch vehicle broke-
up in an elliptical orbit of  655 km by 18,410 
km with an inclination of  65.1°.  This is the 
34th identified breakup of  a motor of  this type, 
which also employs hypergolic propellants. 
More than 70 debris were detected after the 
event, but due to the nature of  the eccentric 
orbit the official cataloging process will take 
time.  This ullage motor was flown before Rus-
sian officials were aware of  the breakup po-
tential of  the component and could implement 
mitigation measures.
A much less severe debris-generating 
event apparently occurred on 14 February 
2006, when a single fragment separated from 
the fifth oldest man-made object in Earth or-
bit, the Vanguard 3 spacecraft (International 
Designator 1959-007A, U.S. Satellite Number 
20).  Unlike Vanguards 1 and 2, which are also 
still in orbit about the Earth, Vanguard 3 re-
mains attached to the small third stage of  its 
launch vehicle.  The combined mass of  the 
spacecraft and stage is only 45 kg.  The new 
piece of  debris was cataloged in April 2006 
(International Designator 1959-007B, U.S. Sat-
ellite Number 29005) in an orbit very similar 
to that of  Vanguard 3, i.e., approximately 500 
km by 3300 km with an inclination of  33.4°. 
The principal candidate causes for the release 
are (1) deterioration of  the surface materials of  
Vanguard 3 or its orbital stage and (2) impact 
of  the assembly by a very small meteoroid or 
orbital debris.     ♦
Satellite Breakups
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NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
personnel assisted Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) inspection teams in the identification 
of 41 micrometeoroid/orbital debris 
(MMOD) impact sites on the OV-103 
vehicle (Discovery) during STS-114 post-
f light inspections. There were 14 MMOD 
impacts reported on the crew module 
windows (Figure 1). The largest impact 
feature, a 6.6 mm x 5.8 mm crater on 
window #4, was caused by a particle with 
an estimated diameter of  0.22 mm (Figure 
2). This impact was among the largest 
ever recorded on a crew module window. 
The window was removed and replaced. 
Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy 
Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis of  
dental mold samples from the impact site to 
determine particle origin was inconclusive, 
possibly due to contamination picked up on 
Figure 1. STS-114 crew module window impact map. continued on page 3
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the ferry flight from Edwards Air Force Base 
to KSC.
The radiators on the inside of  the payload 
bay doors sustained 19 impacts (Figure 3) 
with one of  the impacts causing a face sheet 
perforation. The 0.61 mm diameter hole was 
produced by a particle with an estimated 
diameter of  0.4 mm, which approaches the 
0.5-mm critical particle diameter of  the wing 
leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) 
panel high-temperature regions (Zone 3, 
Figure 4) that was established during Return 
to Flight testing of  the RCC panels.
An inspection of  the payload bay door 
exterior insulation (FRSI) revealed a 5.8 
mm x 4.5 mm defect that was caused by an 
MMOD particle with unknown composition, 
as the sample obtained was contaminated.
Figure 5 provides a summary of  the 
exterior surface survey that was conducted 
following the STS-114 mission. Two win-
dows were removed and replaced due to hy-
pervelocity impact. Nineteen impacts were 
recorded on the payload bay door radiators, 
with one face sheet penetration. Three im-
pact sites were identified on the FRSI. There 
were four hypervelocity impact sites detected 
on the wing leading edge RCC panels. One 
impact was detected on the top cover of  
the TPS sample box (TSB) payload that was 
mounted on a carrier in the aft portion of  
the payload bay.     ♦
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Figure 3. STS-114 payload bay door radiator impact map.
Figure 4. RCC failure criteria and critical particle size.
Region Debris Meteoroid Unknown TOTAL
Max. Diameter (mm)
Crater Projectile
Windows 0 1 13 14 6.6 0.2
Radiators 2 2 15 19 3.2 0.5
FRSI 1 0 2 3 5.8 1.3
RCC 0 0 4 4 1.8 0.2
TSB cover 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.1
4 3 34 41
Figure 5. STS-114 impact damage summary.
MMOD Failure Criteria for RCC WLE, NC, chin panel
Figure 2. Hypervelocity impact on window #4.
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2.5 cm diameter hole allowed 0.489 12.07
< 2.5 cm diameter hole allowed 0.110 ¼ 0.484 0.99 19.09
Coating Damage (Test 6) 0.081 2.53
Coating Damage (Test 5) 0.058 1.94 1.66
Coating Damage (Test 4) 0.047 0.34
TOTAL 2.93 35.69
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